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Laird, Jackson at odds

Arms pacts—pro and con

Washington 10—The Secretary of Defense, Melvin R. Laird, has told Congress that Strategic Arms Limitation Talks agreements signed in Moscow May 26 "will enhance our security."

But this is no time, he says, to cut back on new submarine and bomber systems and other weapons programs "designed to maintain and preserve essential U.S. strength."

Senator Henry M. Jackson (D., Wash.), a senior member of the Senate Armed Services Committee and head of its subcommittee on strategic arms limitation, says the executive agreement on offensive weapons

give the Russians more of everything, and the treaty limiting defensive antiballistic missiles is a poor bargain for the United States.

The ABM treaty is subject to ratification by the Senate by a two-thirds vote. The offensive weapon agreement is subject to approval by the Congress as a whole but it would not become effective unless the treaty were ratified.

Below are excerpts of the statement of Mr. Laird to House and Senate appropriations and armed services committees June 5 and 6, and the views of Mr. Jackson in an interview with the Associated Press.

Laird

The agreements reached in Moscow will permit us to maintain a strong strategic position, and they will enhance our security by putting the brakes on Soviet strategic-force momentum. These agreements reflect a realistic assessment of the strategic situation, both as it exists today and as it could exist five years from now in the absence of the agreements.

These agreements coupled with the military programs Congress has been and will be asked to fund are a first step. Both sides are pledged to continue negotiations for further steps on limiting strategic arms.


New successes needed

Just as the Moscow agreements were made possible by our successful action in such programs as Safeguard, Poseidon and Minuteman III, these future negotiations can only succeed if we are equally successful in implementing such programs as the Trident (submarine) system, the B-1 bomber, NCA (National Command Authority) defense, Site Defense, SLCM (Submarine Launch Cruise Missile) and accelerated satellite basing of strategic bombers. We must also initiate certain other measures in areas such as intelligence, verification, and command, control and communications.

The provisions of the antibal-
See LAIRD, A7, Col. 1



MELVIN R. LAIRD



HENRY M. JACKSON

Jackson

Question—Senator Jackson, do you believe the Moscow arms agreements jeopardize the security of the United States?

Answer—I can't give a satisfactory answer to that question until all of the hearings have been held, until all of the evidence is in. The Congress, in carrying out its constitutional responsibilities, must study carefully the impact of these agreements on our deterrent posture and the future foreign policy of this country. I expect to play the role of a good lawyer—or a good newspaperman—in examining the witnesses and pursuing the story.

I will say, though, that what I already know is enough to raise some very serious questions in my mind. These agreements have one overriding fatal flaw: they freeze the United States at a serious numerical inferiority in both ICBM's and submarines while they authorize the Russians to continue their buildup.

Can exercise options

Not only do the Soviets get 1,618 ICBM's to our 1,054 ICBM's, but they are permitted to exercise options that would give them 62 modern nuclear ballistic missile submarines to our 44. With this sort of strategic superiority Soviet leaders are sure to be more vigorous in the assertion of their interests, to be willing to accept greater risks in order to advance them, thus introducing harder Soviet bargaining at the conference table and new elements of danger and turbulence into international affairs.

Q.—Do you know at this time whether you will oppose the

See JACKSON, A7, Col. 2

Laird, Jackson view arms pact's

Laird, from AI

the missile treaty require that, upon ratification we make the following changes in our Safeguard ABM program:

1. Cancel plans for a full 2-site Safeguard program;
2. Stop construction at the Safeguard site at Malmsstrom Air Force Base in Montana, dismantle the site, and stop all advanced site preparation work at Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri, and Warren Air Force Base in Wyoming. . . .

We will continue the Site Defense program, making modifications to accelerate its development and testing. Without further constraints on Soviet offensive programs, which could be achieved in follow-on negotiations but which do not exist now, we need this hedge for insuring the survivability of our land-based ICBMs.

We will vigorously pursue a comprehensive ABM technology program. This program will provide knowledge of ABM technology potential that will help us understand better Soviet ABM developments, help us ensure adequate penetration capability for U.S. offensive missiles, and examine ABM development options that might be exercised if permitted by future agreements, or if otherwise necessary.

No time for complacency

It is essential that the U.S. start work now to build an ABM defense for our command, control and communications in the Washington, D.C., area. . . . Our plans call for using the radar equipment currently being built for Malmsstrom and Whiteman at the new Washington, D.C. site. . . .

We believe it is essential to adjust other selected strategic programs and to provide certain additional hedges for the future. These efforts will include additional work on re-entry vehicle technology plus some advanced technology to improve our command-control communication capabilities, and some increases in intelligence resources to augment verification capabilities. . . .

This is no time for complacency. This is no time to cut back on those programs which are designed to maintain and preserve essential U.S. strength. We must continue such existing programs as MIRV and SRAM (short range attack missile), and those development programs we have in our mind, such as Trident and the B-1 bomber.

Need Trident early

As I have told the Congress, we need Trident at the earliest possible date. The agreements do not in any way lessen the need for Trident. On the contrary, Trident remains a most urgent program.

Similarly, the B-1 bomber development program must be kept on schedule.

. . . The ABM treaty will permit a reduction of about \$650 million in fiscal 1973 ABM funding requests. We propose to apply about \$100 million of that to modification and initiation of other action in the strategic area to insure maintenance of a realistic strategic deterrent. . . .

Initial estimates of these program changes resulting from SALT (strategic arms limitation talks) indicate that additional savings over the next five years could amount to as much as \$5 billion.

JACKSON, from AI

treaty and the executive agreement?

A.—As I have said, I will reserve my judgment until all the evidence is in. The administration has, even now, failed to disclose all of the detailed Moscow understandings that one must have available in order to make an overall assessment of the implications of these agreements. By the way, it was only after I made repeated demands for these "understandings" that the administration admitted their existence and announced their willingness to release them.

Questioned on MIRV

Q.—In defending the agreements, Secretary Laird has said that we have a lead in MIRV (multiple independently-targeted re-entry vehicle) technology and that this lead balances the Soviet advantage in numbers of missiles and submarines. Do you agree?

A.—One of the problems here is that MIRV is not frozen under this agreement. The Soviets, therefore, can—and will—proceed very rapidly under the agreement to catch up with us in the MIRV field. We know they are hard at work on it.

You see, the problem here is that the agreement not only authorizes a Soviet MIRV, it practically goads them into it. This means that they could legally put many warheads on each of their 2,500 missiles. Since they are permitted so many more missiles than we have, and so many missiles many times more powerful than our own (as much as four or five times as large), the Russians could end up overwhelming us in numbers of warheads as well as numbers of missiles and missile size.

Q.—Do you agree with the administration's request for funds to begin building an ABM system around Washington, D.C.

Negotiators warned

A.—No, I do not. Let me say that in the course of our Senate hearings on SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) we warned our negotiators many times that the Congress, at my initiative, had turned down funds for an ABM site around Washington, D.C. on the grounds it would not be effective. I was adamant, in fact, to learn that the President had signed an agreement that called for a deployment on our part that the Congress had previously rejected while abandoning a deployment that the Congress had approved—namely, additional ABM sites to protect our different forces. I will have again in the Senate the Senate Committee to determine the wisdom of a Washington, D.C. site.

Q.—Do you think the other permitted ABM site, at Grand Forks, N.D., is enough?

A.—It is definitely not enough. There is a serious question in my mind whether it will serve any purpose at all—except, possibly, as a research and development area to fast-track improvements in our defensive technology. In the crucial ABM debate in 1969 I was able to get the ABM authorization through the Senate by one vote. I made the point repeatedly—as all the administration—that a single ABM provides too little—an insignificant amount—of protection for our missile sites. The treaty permits us only 100 intercept missiles. The Soviets could overwhelm that ABM defense with only a handful of missiles—and they have thousands. By the way, that's the essence of the problem with the Washington, D.C. site.

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